The state manages real estate assets worth hundreds of thousands of euros, yet little is known about how effective it is in performing this task. Partial analyses suggest that even though the currently available properties are not fully utilized, the state keeps renting more and more premises from private entities. Furthermore, the media have pointed out that these entities are sometimes affiliated with some of the governing political parties at that time. We therefore assume that the state does not act in an economically effective manner in this domain and that it creates a non-transparent environment open for easy exploitation.
Since there is a lack of sufficient coverage on the subject of management of state property, this project aims to provide a detailed analysis of effectiveness and costs of administering state-owned real estate as well as real estate rented by the state from private entities, with focus on the ministries of finance, culture and economy. Aside from initiating public discussion and outlining possible improvements, we will seek to decrease current asymmetry in information and thus enhance public oversight.
Using requests filed under the provisions of the Act on Free Access to Information, we will identify real estate owned by the chosen ministries and the area of office space within it; costs of administering it (energy, personnel and security services, maintenance); and estimate the ratio of office area per one employee. Further, we will identify real estate rented from private entities; similarly determine the costs and effectiveness of their administration; and look into possible political ties of their owners using data from the Central Register of Contracts and the Business Register on Internet. Additionally, we will benchmark the gathered information with data on the costs and effectiveness of real estate administration in the private sphere in given localities.